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NOTE
The Progress and Pitfalls of
Lawrence v. Texas
NICOLE R. HARTt
INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court's decision to overturn a Texas
anti-sodomy statute was handed down in the summer of
2003,' it was both lauded by its supporters and condemned
by its critics. Many gay2 rights advocates and commenta-
tors felt confident the movement had gained a solid victory.3
t Assistant Executive Editor, Buffalo Law Review, 2004-2005; J.D. Candidate,
State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2005; B.A., Binghamton
University, 2001. I wish to thank Joseph Zargari for his careful review and
thoughtful suggestions, James Gardner for his invaluable advice and the
members of the Buffalo Law Review for their editing assistance. I would also
like to thank my parents, brother and closest friends for patiently enduring my
absence while revising this Note.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. In the interest of literary fluidity, I use the term "gay" to refer to lesbians,
gay men, and bisexual and transgender individuals.
3. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, The Supreme Court: The Reaction; Gays
Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003,
at A20 ("Gay activists, many in tears, called the ruling the most significant
legal victory in the gay rights movement."); see also Landmark Ruling for Gay
Civil Rights: U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas 'Homosexual Conduct'
Law (June 26, 2003), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/
record?record=1281 (quoting Ruth Harlow, Lambda Legal Director and lead
counsel on the case: "Today the U.S. Supreme Court closed the door on an era of
intolerance and ushered in a new era of respect and equal treatment for gay
Americans.... This historic civil rights victory recognizes that love, sexuality
1417
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At the same time, those opposed to the Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,4 and to gay legal rights in general, saw
the opinion as a reason to mobilize the public against the
gay rights movement. 5
Supporters of Lawrence are correct in some respects.
The Court's language in this case is unprecedented when
compared to the history of gay rights jurisprudence. Its
decision to overrule Bowers and to adjudicate the petition-
ers' claim under a more flexible due process approach,
rather than an equality approach, unlocks the potential for
more meaningful legal and political recognition of gay inti-
macy. Further, the Court's decision to overturn state anti-
sodomy laws removes the presumption of criminality that
has historically been placed on gays in a variety of contexts.
This, in and of itself, is a major accomplishment for the gay
community.
The Court's holding, however, was expressly limited
and, under a more narrow interpretation, may articulate a
mere right to be left alone for gays. Furthermore, the
opinion failed to lay down a clear rule regarding the right to
privacy for gays. Notwithstanding these pitfalls of
Lawrence, the Court's strategy may end up working to the
advantage of gay rights litigators and activists by quelling
some of the more rampant backlash that may have ensued
had the Court been reluctant to, for instance, explicitly re-
ject the application of its holding to same-sex marriage.
and family play the same role in gay people's lives as they do for everyone
else.").
4. See, e.g., Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Sodomy Law (Nov. 18,
2003), at www.cnn.com/2003fLAW/06/26/scotus.sodomy/ (quoting one opponent
of the Court's decision who asserts it would "undermine the legal foundation of
marriage, lead to more deaths among gay men from sexually transmitted
diseases and lead to schoolchildren being taught 'that homosexual sodomy is the
same as marital sex.'"); see also Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: The
Opposition; Conservatives Furious Over Court's Direction, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2003, at A5.
5. Such mobilization, for instance, has recently taken the form of
widespread opposition to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Jay Evensen, Marriage
of Gays is a Social Destabilizer, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 23, 2003, at AA01; David
D. Kirkpatrick, Bush's Push for Marriage Falls Short for Conservatives, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at A18; Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong
Support Is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, § 1, at 1.
Although there was strong support for a ban on gay marriage, the Senate
nonetheless blocked an initiative to ban same-sex unions. See Carl Hulse,
Senators Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions; Amendment, Endorsed by
Bush, Fails After Days of Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at Al.
[Vol. 521418
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What follows is not only an attempt to elucidate the
Court's opinion but also to analyze what the opinion means
and will continue to mean for the gay community. This
analysis does not begin or end with the law. The discussion
below is at once legal, political, philosophical and cultural.
I agree with Law Professor Nan Hunter that the opinion in
Lawrence is simply "too rich to rest one's interpretation
with law alone." To the gay community, Lawrence repre-
sents much more than a legal document. As such, it
deserves a deeper level of interpretation
In an effort to familiarize the reader with the context in
which Lawrence arose, Part I will begin with a history of
the Supreme Court's impact on gay legal rights in general.
This portion of the article will explore the plethora of Su-
preme Court cases dealing with gay rights before focusing
specifically on Griswold and the gay rights cases that fol-
lowed. The Court's reasoning in Lawrence will be explored
in Part II, in addition to Justice O'Connor's concurrence
and Justice Scalia's dissent. Part III will continue with an
analysis of the Lawrence Court's language and holding,
including an in-depth discussion of the many problems in-
herent in an equality approach as well as a critique of the
Court's due process analysis. Also included below is an ex-
ploration into the impact of the Court's strategy on the
future of the right to privacy for gays as well as the impact
on gay legal rights in general.
I. GAY RIGHTS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. Pre-Privacy
The quest to find gay legal equality in the Supreme
Court began almost two decades before the Stonewall
Rebellion when a small Los Angeles publication' named
ONE was confiscated by the post office on grounds that it
6. Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103-04(2004) [hereinafter Hunter, Living].
7. See JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 30-33 (2001) [hereinafter COURTING JUSTICE].
2004] 1419
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was "obscene."8 The self-described gay magazine brought
suit against the postmaster for First Amendment speech
violations.9 In a one-lined opinion, the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court's ruling and found in favor of the
publication."
While the Court's decision in ONE may have seemed
like a small step forward for the gay community," the 1950s
was no doubt marked by societal fears that would adversely
affect the lives of gays. Just as the end of World War I had
given way to fear of difference,12 post-World War II America
was characterized by fear of communism. 3 The federal
government began to target homosexuals as "enemies of
democracy" by labeling them a threat to national security. 4
One of the many men and women who suffered from em-
ployment discrimination 15 was Dr. Frank Kameny, a
Harvard-educated astronomer and professor. 16  In 1956,
Kameny was terminated by the Army and barred from fed-
eral employment for several years following his alleged
solicitation of sex from an undercover police officer. 7 When
8. See id. at 31-33; see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (1993) [hereinafter Cain,
Legal History].
9. See Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1559.
10. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam). Four years later,
the Court again sided with a homosexual magazine in Manual Enters., Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). This time, unlike the one-lined decision in ONE,
Justice Harlan handed down the first full signed opinion in a gay rights case.
COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 83.
11. See, e.g., LEE WALZER, GAY RIGHTS ON TRIAL: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 38
(2002) ("the refusal of the Supreme Court to create a 'gay exception' to the First
Amendment... marked an important victory.").
12. See Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1557-58.
13. See COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 34-35; Cain, Legal History, supra
note 8, at 1558.
14. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 34; see also JONATHAN N. KATZ, 1950-
55: Witch-Hunt; The United States Government Versus Homosexuals, in GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY 91-104 (1976); WALZER, supra note 11, at 32-33.
15. Employment discrimination against gays resulted in the termination of
many gays from government service. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW
59-72 (1999) (referring to the government campaign against homosexuals as a
"kulturkampf" or a state-sponsored cultural war); WALZER, supra note 11, at 36.
16. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 51; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
January 27, 1961: The Birth of Gaylegal Equality Arguments, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 39, 39 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Gaylegal Equality].
17. Eskridge, Gaylegal Equality, supra note 16, at 39.
1420 [Vol. 52
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Kameny unsuccessfully sued the federal government, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.18 The Court's failure to
hear Kameny's case points to society's general fear at the
time to hear, let alone debate about, potential civil or legal
rights for gays.19
The political landscape once again changed in the late
1960s when the Stonewall Rebellion thrust gays into the
public's (and the Court's) field of vision. On June 27, 1969,
riots broke out after the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Green-
wich Village, New York, was raided by policemen for alleg-
edly selling liquor without a proper license."0 The Riots
marked a divergence in tactics for equality within the gay
rights movement. As law professor and gay rights theorist
Patricia Cain points out: "The symbolic power of Stonewall
lay in the fact that it was the drag queens [and the unas-
similated that] were the most visible and the most vocal.
They were demanding respect and they were demanding
"the right to be different."21
The struggle for gay civil rights also manifested itself in
the Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s, at which time
gays were viewed as criminal. Many of the very first
overtly gay rights challenges to reach the Supreme Court
grew out of "sleazy" public arrests of men.22 During this
time, gay bars, in particular, became prime police targets.23
Hence, many of the Supreme Court's first contacts with
gays were cases involving individuals engaged in "criminal"
or "promiscuous public sex"24-gays outside of the main-
stream. The gay community's call for the "right to be
different"25 seemed to be working against them in the Court.
18. Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
19. Interestingly, Murdoch and Price point out that the Court's failure to
grant certiorari to Kameny was "arguably the most important homosexual plea
that the Supreme Court ever turned away-because that action gave the gay-
rights movement its most successful field marshal." COURTING JUSTICE, supra
note 7, at 64.
20. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 51.
21. Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1581 (emphasis added).
22. See COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 88.
23. Id. at 138-39.
24. Id. at 88.
25. See Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1581.
2004] 1421
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The next wave of gay rights cases, many dealing with
deportation, was significant in that the Court's response to
such cases worked to reinforce stereotypes of homosexuals
as depraved or psychopathic. George Fleuti, a Swiss immi-
grant, challenged his deportation all the way to the
Supreme Court," becoming the first individual to have a
case accepted by the Court dealing directly with gay
rights.27  At issue was Fleuti's brief visit to Mexico and
whether he could be barred from returning to the United
States for being "afflicted with a psychopathic personality"
within the meaning of The Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952.28 Fleuti's alleged psychopathic personality was
viewed as directly related to his sexual orientation.29 While
the Court ruled in Fleuti's favor (5-to-4), vacating the lower
court's judgment and conditionally banning deportation, the
issue of whether the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice (INS) could constitutionally deport gays by labeling
them "psychopathic" was never resolved. Consequently,
after Fleuti, the INS "remained an active combatant in the
U.S. war on homosexuals.""
But, if the Justices in Fleuti wavered on the question of
whether gays could be considered insane for purposes of de-
portation, they set the record straight just four years later.
Michael Boutilier and the rest of the gay community suf-
fered what seemed like an extreme setback with the ruling
in Boutilier v. INS.3 Boutilier emigrated from Canada to
the United States in 1954 and applied for United States
citizenship in 1963.32 Upon disclosing his 1959 arrest for
sodomy, the Public Health Service ultimately set Boutilier
up for deportation by labeling him a "psychopathic person-
ality."33 The Supreme Court eventually heard the case; the
issue was whether Congress intended homosexuality to be
evidence of a "psychopathic personality." At the time, the
medical community was split on the issue. Yet, the Court
26. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
27. See COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 88.
28. 374 U.S. at 450-51.
29. See id. at 451.
30. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 99.
31. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
32. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 50.
33. Id.
1422 [Vol. 52
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expressly held that congressional intent trumps psychiatry4
and what Congress intended was clear: the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality" includes homosexuals. 5
B. Griswold and Beyond
While gays were fighting what seemed like attempts to
drive them out of public places, the Supreme Court was
busy deciding the boundaries of what would become a
monumental concept for gay legal rights, namely the consti-
tutional right to privacy. Justice Harlan's impassioned
dissent in Poe v. Ullman,36 laid the groundwork for the
constitutional right to privacy 7 that was developed one year
later in Griswold.38 While the Court in Poe upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Connecticut statute banning the use of
contraceptives for married couples,39  the majority in
Griswold struck down a similar statute, arguing that the
Bill of Rights has "penumbras" which give life to a zone of
protected privacy.
Even though Griswold and many of the privacy cases
that followed were not centered on gay rights issues, the
reasoning used in these cases would not only influence the
34. See Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 124 ("It may be, as some claim, that
'psychopathic personality' is a medically ambiguous term, including several
separate and distinct afflictions. But the test here is what the Congress
intended, not what differing psychiatrists may think.") (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 120. Lower courts have since relied heavily on Boutilier in
devising anti-gay interpretations of laws. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at
219.
36. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 536 ("[Tlhe most substantial claim which these married persons
press is their right to enjoy the privacy of their marital relations free of the
enquiry of the criminal law.... And I cannot agree that their enjoyment of this
privacy is not substantially impinged upon, when they are told that if they use
contraceptives ... the only thing which stands between them and being forced
to render criminal account of their marital privacy is the whim of the
prosecutor."); see also COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 84 (asserting that "the
same dissent that was used to expand most Americans' sexual freedom had
been used to hold back homosexuals' progress." This reaction is not surprising
as Harlan's dissent in Poe specifically excludes gays from his support of the
right to privacy. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 ("I would not suggest that adultery,
homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry,
however privately practiced.").
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. 367 U.S. at 508-09.
40. See 381 U.S. at 484-85.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Lawrence Court, but would also influence the ways in which
gay rights cases were later litigated 4' and the ways in which
gays were perceived by the Court and the public during the
latter half of the twentieth century. Following Griswold,
the Supreme Court proceeded to extend the right of privacy
to encompass a plethora of scenarios, including the right of
unmarried couples to use birth control,42 the right to view
pornography in the home,4 the right of a woman to termi-
nate her pregnancy,44 and the right of a family to be free
from state intrusion absent a compelling government inter-
est.
45
However, the Court's 1976 decision in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney proved that it was not yet pre-
pared to extend the right of privacy to gays, thereby setting
the stage for Bowers v. Hardwick.! The Court in Doe did no
more than summarily affirm the lower court's ruling that a
Virginia statute banning sodomy was constitutional. As a
result, the precedential value of Doe remained a source of
confusion for gay rights litigators for the next eleven
49years.
In the few years preceding Doe, the Court refused to
resolve the confusion regarding the place of gays in the
41. See Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1581 ("The Court's decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut recognized a right to privacy in the context of marital
sex and gave lawyers the necessary foothold to begin challenging the
criminalization of homosexual conduct.") (footnotes omitted).
42. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
43. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). It is debatable, however, whether the Court's reasoning in
Casey substantially lessened the right to privacy guaranteed to women in Roe.
For one, the Court abandons strict scrutiny analysis in favor of an "undue
burden" test. Id. at 876. The Court further abandons Roe's trimester
framework as unworkable. See id. at 872.
45. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
48. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233, 279-80 (1977) (arguing that the Court's summary decision lessened the
precedential value of Doe). Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975)
(stating that the lower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court
"until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not") (quoting Doe
v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973)).
1424 [Vol. 52
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Constitution by denying certiorari" or dismissing appeals5'
in a number of gay rights cases. Significantly, these cases
marked a shift in the legal rights being asserted by gays.52
Subsequently, gays began suing for full constitutional pro-
tection, instead of merely defending themselves against
criminal charges.53 Yet, the Court's persistent efforts at
ignoring gay rights cases by denying certiorari or ruling
against claims for constitutional recognition suggest that it
"was teetering on the brink of reading homosexuals out of
the Constitution."54
However, just as the gay community had begun to lose
steam (and less than a decade before they would be handed
another failure), the University of Missouri's gay student
organization, Gay Lib, won a small victory. The organiza-
tion sued the University for First Amendment free speech
violations after the group was denied university recogni-
tion.55 After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in
favor of the group, 6 the United States Supreme Court
declined to hear the university's appeal.57 Although the
Court did no more than deny certiorari, it was clear that
Gay Lib had won this round of battles.58
50. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (denying
certiorari of an Eighth Circuit decision which denied relief to petitioner for
equal rights violations after being terminated from his job shortly after
applying for a marriage license with another man), denying cert. to 451 F.2d 193
(8th Cir. 1971); see also Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (denying
certiorari of a Fourth Circuit decision denying relief to petitioner who was fired
from a teaching position after the school learned of his sexual orientation),
denying cert. to 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
51. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing petitioner's
claim that Minnesota's marriage statute violated Due Process), dismissing
appeal from 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
52. See COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 172-73.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id. at 199; WALZER, supra note 11, at 112-13, 286.
56. Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8"h Cir. 1977).
57. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). Although the gay
community viewed this case as a victory, it is significant that Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justice Blackmun, conveyed particularly
antiquated notions of homosexuality by comparing it to a communicable
disease. Id. at 1084.
58. In addition to its appearance in student group cases, the First
Amendment was also invoked in cases involving gay bars and gay teachers.
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-50 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d
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In addition to legal transformations, the 1980s brought
major political and social changes in the gay rights move-
ment. While many of these changes seemed to represent a
refreshing break from the outdated stereotypes advanced by
the Court and by the public just two decades earlier, other
changes threatened to destroy the movement's progress.
On the one hand, the American Psychiatric Association, for
example, no longer viewed homosexuality as a mental ill-
ness, thereby putting to rest some of the "medical" argu-
ments used against George Fleuti and Michael Boutilier in
the 1960s.
On the other hand, the emerging AIDS scare and its
perception as a gay disease "threatened to undo the tenta-
tive gains that gay and lesbian Americans had been making
across the country."6 The AIDS epidemic and its perceived
relation to homosexuality no doubt reinforced the idea that
sodomy was a crime worthy of harsh punishment. In fact,
two scholars argue, "Right from the start, sodomy laws had
lurked just under the surface in every homosexual rights
case that reached the Supreme Court."
In 1986, a young Atlanta bartender named Michael
Hardwick 2 was arrested for having oral sex with another
man in the privacy of his own bedroom. 3 He was charged
with violating a Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy. 4 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hard-
1270 (10th Cir, 1984), affd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). Another important First
Amendment case that would later affect gay rights claims was Spence v.
Washington. 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1974). Spence held that the defendant's
improper use of the American flag was covered under the First Amendment
because he intended to convey his opposition to American aggression abroad
and this message was likely to be understood by those who viewed the flag. Id.
59. See COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 276.
60. WALZER, supra note 11, at 58-59.
61. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 158.
62. See id. at 277.
63. See id. at 278.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (2003) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another."). Significantly, the statute does not
target homosexuals on its face, despite the Court's peculiar focus on only gays
when referring to the statute. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-10
(11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
1426 [Vol. 52
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wick,65 holding the Georgia statute unconstitutional because
it violated Hardwick's right to private and intimate associa-
tion as guaranteed and protected by the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.6
Subsequently, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
In a decision that shocked and disheartened supporters
of gay rights,67 the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick refused to
strike down the Georgia sodomy statute, thereby reversing
the Court of Appeals decision. 8 The Court narrowed the
legal issue significantly when it concluded there is no fun-
damental right of "homosexuals to engage in acts of consen-
sual sodomy." 9 The Court went on to discuss the impor-
tance of history in deciding whether a right should be
accorded the status of a fundamental right. Anti-sodomy
laws were described as having "ancient roots."71 Justice
White further asserted that previous cases securing the
right to privacy bore no resemblance to the present case.
Earlier privacy cases were centered on family, marriage
and procreation. 72 According to the Court, these concepts
could not be linked to homosexual activity.
In light of the gay community's loss in Bowers,74 litiga-
65. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
66. Id. at 1212-13.
67. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down By Law in the
1990's USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 1, 37 (1994) ("Since Hardwick, our gay/lesbian civil rights movement has
become scattered, reactive, and understandably but hazardously faithless.").
68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 191-92.
71. Id. at 190-91 (referring, among other decisions, to Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)). These cases, according to the Court, "were interpreted as construing the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental
individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child." Bowers, 478
U.S. at 190.
72. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
73. Id.
74. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021,
1036 [hereinafter Eskridge, Jurisprudence of Tolerance] (arguing that Bowers
was actually more of a disaster for the Supreme Court than it was for the gay
community).
2004] 1427
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tors pushed forth with new constitutional arguments util-
izing both the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment.75 As of 1996, the Court had yet to extend any
of the protections of the Equal Protection Clause to gays. 7
Yet, when the Colorado legislature amended its constitution
to prohibit protection of homosexuals, the issue came before
the Court. Unlike the intermediate scrutiny invoked for
gender classifications and heightened scrutiny invoked for
racial classifications, the Court in Romer v. Evans77
subjected classifications based on sexual orientation to
what appeared to be rational basis review."8 Nonetheless,
Colorado's law failed under the Equal Protection Clause.79
Although the Equal Protection Clause provided a safe-
guard for gays in Romer, the First Amendment right of
association which protected Gay Lib more than twenty
years earlier was denied James Dale in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale.8" Dale's suit arose from his dismissal as a
Scoutmaster after the Scouts learned of his sexual orienta-
tion. 1 The Court ruled that a New Jersey anti-discrimina-
tion statute did not justify intrusion on the group's freedom
of association.82  The Scouts' First Amendment freedoms,
75. Patricia Cain notes that gay rights litigators were forced to "litigate
around" Bowers by developing new constitutional arguments which were
typically grounded in the Equal Protection Clause. Cain, Legal History, supra
note 8, at 1617-39.
76. See Sarah E. Brewer et al., Sex and The Supreme Court: Gays, Lesbians,
and Justice, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 377, 395 (Craig A. Rimmerman et
al. eds., 2000) ("[TIhe Supreme Court in 1996 had yet to extend any of the
protections of the Equal Protection Clause to classifications based on sexual
orientation.").
77. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
78. The Court in Romer noted that the Colorado Amendment failed, in part,
because "it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." Id. at 632.
However, it is debatable whether the Court here is applying rational basis
review or a somewhat heightened standard of review. See Edward Stein,
Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a Glimpse of the Future,
10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 269 (2004) [hereinafter Stein, Introducing
Lawrence] (noting that many have thought the Court in Romer must have been
applying more than rational basis review since the requirement of mere
rationality is so weak). However, Stein goes on to state that a narrow reading
of Romer would support the argument that the Court applied rational basis
review to strike down the Amendment. Id. at 283.
79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
80. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
81. See generally COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 496-99.
82. 530 U.S. at 640.
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according to Justice Rehnquist, outweighed the state's
interest in deterring discrimination.83
II. OVERVIEW OF LAWRENCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court took seventeen years to rethink its
decision in Bowers. After contemplating a Texas statute
criminalizing sodomy between persons of the same sex,84 the
majority in Lawrence v. Texas held that the statute was un-
constitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.85 Gay rights groups hailed the
case as a major leap forward for the gay community and as
a historic extension of the right to privacy."
The case began when police entered a residence in re-
sponse to a reported weapons disturbance.87 Upon entrance,
police found John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner
engaged in "deviant sexual intercourse,"88 a misdemeanor
offense.89 Under Texas law, deviant sexual intercourse is
defined as "any contact between any part of the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person" or
"the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another per-
son with an object."9" Both were subsequently arrested and
fined $200 each.91
83. Lee Walzer points out, "[t]he majority ruling in Dale broke new ground
in First Amendment law by giving greater force to the notion that the freedom
of association also comprises the freedom not to associate." WALZER, supra note
11, at 114.
84. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits an
offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex.").
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Sodomy Law, supra note 4
("[The Court's] [r]uling establishes new legal ground in privacy.").
87. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001), rev'd, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
88. Id. at 350.
89. Id.
90. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2003).
91. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
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At trial, neither Lawrence nor Garner challenged the
propriety of the police conduct leading up to their arrests.92
The narrow issue thus presented to the Texas Court of
Appeals was whether Section 21.06's criminalization of
same-sex intercourse93 was unconstitutional.94 Appellants
(Lawrence and Garner) argued the statute violated equal
protection guarantees based on sexual orientation and gen-
der. They further argued that the statute violated the right
to privacy guaranteed by the state and federal constitu-
tions.
The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. In
upholding the constitutionality of Section 21.06, the court
reasoned first that gays were not a suspect class 9' since
there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy.96 "Thus,
the prohibition of homosexual sodomy is permissible if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."97 The stat-
ute here passes rational basis because the State's interest
in preserving public morals is legitimate and the prohibi-
tion of homosexual conduct serves to rationally advance this
interest.9" Secondly, the court argued that although gender
is a suspect class under Texas law, 99 Section 21.06 does
actually not burden a particular gender and thus "does not
subject individuals to unequal treatment.""°  Lastly, the
Court of Appeals ruled that there was no state or federal
constitutional "zone of privacy" shielding homosexual con-
duct from state interference. 1 '
92. Id. Both appellants entered pleas of nolo contendere. Id.
93. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) ("A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex.").
94. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
95. Id. at 353-54.
96. Id. at 357.
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id. at 357.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 359. The Court argued that "While Section 21.06 alludes to sex,
not every statutory reference to gender constitutes an unlawful 'gender-
classification."' Id. at 358.
101. Id. at 360-62.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari0 2 and ultimately decided in favor of Lawrence and
Garner."°3 The Court's approach to the constitutional issues
raised by this case differed markedly from the approach
advanced by the Texas Court of Appeals. First, the
Supreme Court did not explicitly rule on the issue of equal
protection. The Court stated: "Were we to hold the statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn dif-
ferently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex
and different-sex participants."0 4 According to Justice
Kennedy, if the case were argued under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, Texas could simply rewrite the statute to
satisfy any equal protection requirements. The Court does,
however, note that an equal protection rationale for invali-
dating the Texas statute is "tenable" but that the case
requires the Court to address whether Bowers itself "has
continuing validity.'
0 5
The Supreme Court further differs from the Texas
Court of Appeals by explicitly recognizing a right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause. 6  Significantly, the
Supreme Court in Lawrence frames the issue much more
broadly than the Bowers Court had twenty years ago. In-
stead of focusing on the narrow question of whether there
exists a fundamental right to sodomy, Justice Kennedy asks
whether the Texas statute violates the petitioners' right to
liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause."'
He asserts, "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim
the individual put forward, just as it would demean a mar-
102. See Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
103. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104. Id. at 575.
105. Id. at 574-75.
106. Id. at 578 ("[The petitioners'] right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government.").
107. Id. at 564 ("We granted certiorari to consider... [wihether petitioners'
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate
their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted).
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ried couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.""8
In overruling Bowers, °9 Justice Kennedy considers a
number of issues. He begins his opinion by rejecting the
historical argument asserted in Bowers that proscriptions
against sodomy have ancient roots."10 There is no distinct
history of laws directed at gays specifically; the sodomy
laws that did exist were directed at non-procreative sex in
general, heterosexual or otherwise."' Lastly, nineteenth
century sodomy prosecutions were rarely enforced against
consenting adults, but rather sought to punish "predatory
acts of an adult man against a minor girl or minor boy.""2
Next, Justice Kennedy points to international opinion
and United States case law, thereby shedding more doubt
on the Court's reasoning in Bowers. Both the British
Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights have
criticized laws punishing homosexual conduct. " After
examining Casey and Romer, the Court asserts that the
holding of Bowers has been substantially weakened by sub-
sequent case law."4
Lastly, the opinion refers to the ethical and moral con-
siderations relevant to sodomy laws directed at same-sex
conduct when it declares, "The State cannot demean [the
petitioners'] existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime. '  The Court goes on
to note that the decision in Bowers would deny homosexuals
the right to seek autonomy "for [purposes of defining one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life]."
108. Id. at 567.
109. Id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today... and now is overruled.").
110. Id. at 568 ("[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 569.
113. Id. at 572-73.
114. Id. at 573-75.
115. Id. at 578.
116. Id. at 574.
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B. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agrees with the
Lawrence Court that the Texas statute at issue is unconsti-
tutional.1 17 However, her rationale lies in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Justice
O'Connor relies on Equal Protection, she believes that the
majority's decision in Lawrence to overrule Bowers was
incorrect and unnecessary."'
Justice O'Connor begins her concurrence with a discus-
sion of the Equal Protection Clause and its central purpose:
"that all persons similarly situated ... be treated alike."119
She explains that the Court will uphold legislation subject
to rational basis review as long the statute at issue is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 120 A bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, however, will
not pass constitutional muster because this objective cannot
be a legitimate state interest.
121
The concurrence frames the issue differently than the
majority opinion. Justice O'Connor asks whether, under
the Equal Protection Clause, a state's moral disapproval of
a particular group can justify a statute that bans homosex-
ual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. She declares that
it cannot. 2 In concluding her analysis, Justice O'Connor
notes that other laws, which distinguish between hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals, might pass rational basis review
if Texas could assert a legitimate state interest.123 She lists
ensuring national security and preserving the traditional
117. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)("I agree with the Court that Texas' statute banning same-sex sodomy is
unconstitutional.").
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 580 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
122. Id. at 582 ("[W]e have never held that moral disapproval, without any
other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons.").
123. Id. at 585.
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institution of marriage as but two examples of legitimate
state interests.2
Despite her thorough evaluation of the Texas statute's
inability to pass rational basis review, O'Connor devotes
little time to explaining precisely why the statute should be
adjudicated under the Equal Protection Clause and not the
Due Process Clause. Aside from stating that persons simi-
larly situated should be treated alike, she notes that this
case raises a different issue than Bowers because the Texas
statute at issue in Lawrence seeks to criminalize homosex-
ual sodomy only. 125  Justice O'Connor discusses the Due
Process Clause once more when she notes, "Whether a
sodomy law that is neutral both in effect and application
would violate the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause is an issue that need not be decided today."
126
C. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia's reasoning deviates from both Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor on several accounts. First,
he takes issue with the Majority's failure to overrule the
central holding of Bowers: that there is no fundamental
right to homosexual sodomy.12' He argues that, in deciding
whether to overrule Bowers, the issue for the Court's reso-
lution was whether Texas's prohibition of sodomy infringes
a fundamental right.1 28 Upon concluding that the Court did
not overrule this central holding of Bowers, Justice Scalia
124. Id.
125. Id. at 582 ("The only question in front of the Court in Bowers was
whether the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protected a right
to engage in homosexual sodomy.... [The issue here is] whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to
justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual
sodomy.").
126. Id. at 584 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor further asserts that
even a "neutral" sodomy law would not stand under an equal protection
analysis. See id. at 584-85; see also supra note 104.
127. Id. at 594 ("The Court today does not overrule [the holding in Bowers].
Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a
'fundamental liberty interest.' Instead ... the Court concludes that the
application of Texas's statute to petitioners' conduct fails the rational-basis
test.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 605.
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briefly condemns the Court's contention that the Texas law
has no rational basis.
129
Justice Scalia further criticizes Justice O'Connor's reli-
ance on the Equal Protection Clause. He notes that Justice
O'Connor's application of a "more searching form of rational
basis review" " is not supported by the case law to which
she refers. Under a traditional rational basis review ,13' he
argues that Texas's reason for the law at issue-that soci-
ety finds homosexual sodomy immoral-is an appropriate
justification. Simply put, rational basis is satisfied by "tra-
ditional notions of sexual morality."
132
Two themes pervade Justice Scalia's dissent: Roe and
the "homosexual agenda." A portion of the dissent analo-
gizes Roe to Bowers. Justice Scalia ponders why wide-
spread opposition to Bowers is viewed as one reason to
overrule the case in Lawrence while widespread opposition
to Roe was one reason to reaffirm the case in Casey. 1 Fur-
ther, he believes state laws against bigamy, same-sex
marriage, incest, prostitution and bestiality (to name a few)
are called into question by the Majority's opinion in
Lawrence, thus creating a "massive disruption of the cur-
rent social order." 4 Contrastly, overruling Roe would have
"simply restored the regime that existed for centuries before
1973.",
Justice Scalia blames these inconsistencies on the
Court's adoption of the "homosexual agenda." In his view,
the Court's holding shows that it is not serving as a neutral
observer of the Constitution but rather as a follower of
homosexual activists and law school elites. The Court has
clearly "taken sides in the culture war"136 by imposing a par-
ticular set of beliefs on an unwilling populace.
129. Scalia notes that "this proposition is so out of accord with our
jurisprudence... that it requires little discussion." Id. at 599.
130. Id. at 601 (quoting O'Connor, J., concurring, at 580).
131. Id. at 600 ("No purpose to discriminate against men or women as a
class can be gleaned from the Texas law, so rational-basis review applies.").
132. Id. at 601.
133. Id. at 587-88.
134. Id. at 590-91.
135. Id. at 591.
136. Id. at 602.
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III. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF THE LAWRENCE DECISION
Scholars are clearly split on a number of issues related
to the Lawrence decision. While some argue the Court was
correct in utilizing a Due Process analysis,'37 others argue
the Court should have addressed the petitioners' claims
under the Equal Protection Clause.138 While some believe
the Court's reasoning shows promise for the future of gay
marriage,139 others believe the Court chose to articulate a
mere "liberty" right at the expense of a more meaningful
right to privacy. ° Despite these disagreements, however,
there seems to be a general consensus on two points: that
Lawrence is at once perplexing' and revolutionary.' This
Note takes that consensus one step further with an in-
depth exploration of the Court's holding, reasoning, and
language and of how the strengths and weaknesses of the
decision will affect, or have affected, the lives of gays in the
United States.
The following sections of this Note explore several
issues, including whether the Lawrence Court was correct
in overruling Bowers and in adjudicating the petitioners'
137. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jurisprudence of Tolerance, supra note 74, at 1062
("[Tihe Court was right to confront Hardwick head on.... Justice O'Connor's
approach would not only have left most sodomy laws on the books, but would
have left Hardwick in place as a symbol of permanent gay inequality.").
138. See, e.g., Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choosing Liberty Over Equality and
Sacrificing Both: Equal Protection and Due Process in Lawrence v. Texas, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 411 (2004).
139. See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry:
Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1184 (2004).
140. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence
v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
141. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and
Sexual Privacy after Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38 (2004)
(recognizing that criticism can be "leveled at Justice Kennedy for failing to
write a clear, crisp, clean opinion."); Hunter, Living, supra note 6, at 1103
(noting that Lawrence is "heavier on rhetoric than on clarity"); Andrew
Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1180 (regarding the
reasoning in Lawrence as "obscure" and as laying down "no clear rule.");
Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-A-Delic Supreme Court: "Anal Sex," "Mystery,"
"Destiny," and the "Transcendent" in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 365, 366 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence would have more constitutional
force had it been written more clearly).
142. See, e.g., Hunter, Living, supra note 6, at 1137 (describing Lawrence as
a "breakthrough"); Stein, Introducing Lawrence, supra note 78, at 288
(describing Lawrence as "clearly a landmark decision for... gay rights.").
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claim solely under the Due Process Clause. The answer to
both questions is "yes." First, since Bowers was not argued
correctly, the Court in Lawrence need not articulate a fun-
damental right in over to overturn it. Second, utilizing an
equal protection framework to overturn anti-sodomy laws is
fraught with philosophical and political difficulties that
may be alleviated through reliance on the Due Process
Clause. Furthermore, although the Lawrence Court's deci-
sion to narrow its holding does not match up with its
relatively progressive rhetoric, the opinion may nonetheless
serve to benefit the gay community because it is in step
with popular sentiment regarding gay rights.
A. The Lawrence Court's Treatment of Bowers
As noted above, one of Justice Scalia's main contentions
with the Majority is that it fails to articulate a fundamental
right and thus has no grounds for overruling Bowers.'
This argument is based upon one major and incorrect as-
sumption: that Bowers was argued correctly. One of the
major points in Lawrence is that the Bowers Court did not
frame the issue correctly as an initial matter.' For the
Lawrence Court, the issue was not whether there exists a
fundamental right to sodomy but rather whether adults are
free to engage in consensual sexual intimacy under the Due
Process Clause. In fact, Justice Kennedy explicitly states
that the way in which Bowers frames the issue "demeans"
the claim put forward by the petitioners.4 '
Further, Justice Kennedy finds that the Texas law fails
under rational basis-the lowest standard of judicial
review. However, the Court's failure in Lawrence to clearly
articulate the right at issue as fundamental is not a
statement that it clearly viewed the right as less than fun-
damental. It merely shows that the Lawrence Court is
adopting a more flexible approach to the traditional due
process analysis. The Court's initial test is thus whether
143. See supra Part II.C (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent).
144. See Jami Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The
Ontology and Logic of Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423, 425
(2004) (denying that Bowers was correctly argued but recognizing that if it were
correctly argued, a fundamental right would have to be asserted in order to
overturn it).
145. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
2004] 1437
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the government's actions were legitimate, not whether the
right at issue is fundamental. " ' Since the Lawrence Court
holds that there is no legitimate basis for the Texas anti-
sodomy statute, there is no need to ask whether there exists
a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy.
B. Philosophical and Political Problems Regarding
"Equality"
Yet, while part of the majority's analysis in Lawrence
may represent a new, more flexible judicial approach to
scrutinizing due process issues, " 7 its treatment of the Equal
Protection Clause is virtually non-existent. As noted above,
Justice Kennedy rejects any application of the Equal
Protection Clause by noting that such an approach is "ten-
able" but not proper.' He further notes that equality of
treatment and substantive due process "are linked in
important respects, and a decision on [substantive due pro-
cess] advances both interests." 9
The decision to adjudicate (or to advance as a litigator)
a substantive due process or an equality claim is signifi-
cant-particularly within the context of state anti-sodomy
laws 5 ° which attempt to regulate the private, sexual lives of
gays. Equality arguments in this context raise serious
philosophical and political dilemmas that may be avoided
under a substantive due process analysis. What follows is a
146. See Hunter, Living, supra note 6, at 1116-17 (discussing the Court's
more flexible approach). Incidentally, the Court went so far as to analogize the
rights at issue in Lawrence to those previously established as fundamental. Id.
at 1117.
147. See id. at 1117-23.
148. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); see also supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
149. Id. at 575. In addition to Justice O'Connor's criticism of the majority,
scholars have also criticized the majority for not relying on the Equal Protection
Clause in its opinion. For instance, Professor Andrew Seligsohn argues that an
equality argument provides a far more "coherent and persuasive basis for
eliminating anti-sodomy laws" than one based on substantive due process.
Seligsohn, supra note 138, at 422.
150. In this section, I am referring both to anti-sodomy statutes that make
no distinction based on sex (i.e., statutes that apply to both homosexuals and
heterosexuals) and those that specifically target homosexuals (e.g., the Texas
statute at issue in Lawrence). This is because, regardless of whether the
statute directly targets gays, any ban on sodomy could disproportionately affect
gays.
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discussion of the difficulties inhereni in arguing equality in
order to overturn state anti-sodomy laws as well as a
defense of the majority's refusal to adjudicate the petition-
ers' case under the Equal Protection Clause.
A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection argument
based on class discrimination asserts that the Court should
accord gays heightened scrutiny because they are a suspect
class. Such scrutiny is warranted if the unequal
treatment of gays is based on "irrelevant characteristics."152
Traditionally, such a determination will take into account
whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination,
whether the discrimination is invidious, whether the char-
acteristic on which the discrimination is based upon is
immutable, and whether the group lacks political power.13
One of the major problems with a class-based equal pro-
tection argument is that the Supreme Court has not
resolved whether gays deserve heightened judicial scrutiny.
The Court in Romer54 struck down a Colorado amendment
under what appeared to be rational basis review. 5 But
gays as a group have been unsuccessful in meeting the
requirements for heightened scrutiny. Without heightened
scrutiny, a law targeting gays would only be subject to
rational basis review, a standard by which the Court is un-
likely to strike down a state law.
156
Furthermore, an argument for heightened scrutiny in a
case such as Lawrence would move the question of whether
151. The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1985).
152. Id. at 1299.
153. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, 663, 666 (2d ed. 1997) (citing Watkins v. United States Army, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)).
154. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
155. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
156. But see Jonathan Tatun, Note, A Closer Look at Bowers v. Hardwick:
State and Federal Decisions Concerning Sexual Privacy and Equal Protection,
19 TouRo L. REV. 183, 193 (2002). Tatun notes that "morality as a basis for
legislation will not always be upheld." In this sense, equal protection or due
process claims might succeed under rational basis review because the state
purpose of protecting morality cannot be rationally related to stripping gays of
their legal rights to privacy or equal protection. Indeed, this is precisely what
Justice O'Connor argued in defense of an equality approach. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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homosexuality is "immutable" to the forefront.157 The prob-
lem with arguing immutability in a sodomy/gay rights case
is twofold. First of all, very few judges have been
persuaded by the argument that homosexuality is an im-
mutable trait158 notwithstanding available scientific evi-
dence." 9 Second, an argument for a gay right to privacy
based on immutability is essentially an argument based on
helplessness and happenstance. As historian John
D'Emilio puts it: "to argue that our identity, our sexuality,
is in effect an accident of birth or of early conditioning is to
embrace a sexual ideology that negates the choices we have
made."1 O
The immutability argument is further intertwined with
the problematic status/conduct distinction that often char-
acterizes gay rights debates. 161 In order to determine
whether a law is directed at gays as a class or directed at a
particular form of conduct (homosexuality as status versus
homosexuality as conduct), one must first determine what it
means to be homosexual (homosexuality as an immutable
characteristic versus homosexuality as a choice of life-
style).6 2 To be sure, what it means to be homosexual is "far
from settled."6 3 Professors Jami Weinstein and Tobyn De
Marco believe there are at least three key components to
any meaningful definition of homosexuality: "first, conduct,
157. But cf Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology:
A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1994).(arguing that "immutability is not a requirement but a factor."). However, in
gay rights equal protection cases, courts seem to rely heavily on immutability.
See, e.g., Paisley Currah, Queer Theory, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and
Transsexual Marriages, in SEXUAL IDENTITIES, QUEER POLITICS 178, 183 (Mark
Blasius ed., 2001) ("While immutability is not a litmus test for heightened
scrutiny, courts and commentators discussing classifications based on sexual
orientation generally seem to rely heavily on it.") (quoting Mark Fajer).
158. See Halley, supra note 157, at 513-16.
159. Id. at 516.
160. John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tension
Between Gay History and Politics, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY,
POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 181, 187 (1992).
161. See, e.g., Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1641 (criticizing Post-
Bowers legal arguments that refer to homosexuality but not homosexual sex).
162. Cf. Weinstein & DeMarco, supra note 144, at 426 (noting that
philosophical assumptions about what it means to be homosexual are useful
tools for determining whether a law is aimed at policing conduct or
homosexuals as a class).
163. Id.
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behavior, and acts; second, self-identification or sexual
'orientation'; and third, desires and fantasies.' 64
These distinctions about what it means to be homosex-
ual lie at the very heart of an equal protection argument
against state anti-sodomy statutes. If the statute is said to
be directed at homosexuals as a class, 165 the Texas statute
at issue in Lawrence could be read as discriminating
against a class, to the success of the petitioners. But if the
statute is said to target mere acts, 66 then arguably no
distinct class has been targeted for discrimination, to the
dismay of the petitioners.
This debate underscores some of the more significant
problems with utilizing an equal protection analysis to
overturn state anti-sodomy statutes. First of all, the Court
is forced to bifurcate status and conduct at the expense of a
more meaningful definition of homosexuality. More specifi-
cally, a coherent definition of homosexuality must recognize
that conduct and status are inextricably intertwined
because "the choice to perform certain sexual acts is a fun-
damental criterion for determining who might be regarded
[as] homosexual." '167 Second, for purposes of determining
whether an anti-sodomy statute is unconstitutional, it sim-
ply should not matter whether homosexuality is "immuta-
ble" or learned. This dichotomy does little to advance the
plight of the gay community.'68 The right to participate in
private, consensual sex with another person should be
constitutionally protected regardless of whether John
chooses to have sex with Tyrone because he has been homo-
sexual since birth or because he simply wonders, as a
straight man, what it would be like to be intimate with
another man. A right based on the immutability of one's
sexual orientation also ignores feminists who choose same-
164. Id.
165. The majority and concurrence in Lawrence supports this view. 539
U.S. 558, 574, 580-84 (2003).
166. The dissent in Lawrence supports this view. Id. at 599-601 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
167. Weinstein & DeMarco, supra note 144, at 427; see also Cain, Legal
History, supra note 8, at 1641 (noting the absurdity of ignoring sex when
making identity-affirming legal arguments in favor of gay rights).
168. Halley, supra note 157, at 517 ("Neither essentialism nor
constructivism is necessarily gay-affirmative.").
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sex relationships as the only legitimate and fulfilling way to
experience intimacy in a patriarchal society.1"9
Some gay rights scholars believe that advancing equal
protection arguments based on sex discrimination may alle-
viate some of the immutability problems inherent in a
class-based claim. 7 ° An equal protection argument based
on sex discrimination need not prove that gays are a sus-
pect class subject to heightened scrutiny since the relevant
characteristic is gender, not sexual orientation. Any state
law that imposes a discriminatory gender classification is
subject to intermediate scrutiny by the Court, a more
exacting brand of judicial scrutiny than rational basis re-
view. 7' Under this theory of equal protection, any state law
that discriminates against gays also discriminates on the
basis of gender. Simply put, Susan can marry Bob because
she is a woman and he is a man, but Jack cannot marry
Bob simply because Jack is a man. Jack is the target of sex
discrimination. A state law that prohibits men from doing
what women can do discriminates on the basis of gender.7 2
In addition to its ability to invoke heightened scrutiny,
the sex discrimination approach has also been supported
because it arguably avoids the immutability problems
169. See, e.g., Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian
Existence, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND SEXUALITY: A READER 199 (Richard Parker
& Peter Aggleton eds., 1999). Rich argues that lesbianism should be
understood as more than desired sexual experience with another woman.
Rather, lesbianism can be understood as, among other things, a bonding against
male tyranny. Id. at 210.
170. See, e.g., Currah, supra note 157, at 183 (quoting Mark Fajer).
171. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). It is worth
noting here that the standard for gender claims may even be closer to strict
scrutiny that the Court initially suggested in Frontiero. See United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (suggesting that gender discrimination must
meet an "exceedingly persuasive" and "substantially related" test of judicial
scrutiny).
172. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for
Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 487 (2001); see also ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 35,
53-71 (2002); cf. KATE BORNSTEIN, MY GENDER WORKBOOK: HOW TO BECOME A
REAL MAN, A REAL WOMAN, THE REAL YOU, OR SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY (1998).
In this piece, Bornstein touches on the relationship between gender and
homosexuality, albeit from a socio-psychological perspective rather than a legal
one. She contemplates to what extent same-sex issues are connected to the
perceived boundaries of gender. See generally Nan Hunter, The Sex
Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL 397 (2001);
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
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inherent in a class-based claim. This avoidance stems from
the fact that the relevant characteristic is sex, not sexual-
ity.173  Since sex is generally viewed as an indisputable
biological characteristic, or at least it is viewed as more
"biological" that sexuality, the immutability factor becomes
less important. The dominant view is that the sex assigned
to an infant at birth by reference to the infant's genitalia
will accurately predict whether the child identifies as male
or female. 174 Under this model, there is little need to focus
on whether an individual is "born" a woman or man or
whether an individual "chooses" to be a woman or man.
However, sex-based equal protection arguments rely on
the assumption that gender is a rigid characteristic of per-
sonhood. Just as the characterization of "sexuality"
remains imprecise, 7 ' so do the categories of sex and gender.
As noted above, the immutability factor in class-based
equal protection cases would require the Court to adopt an
unsatisfying, less-than-complete view of homosexuality.
Similarly, a sex-based claim assumes a binary sex para-
digm. But the male-female paradigm has been questioned
both by members of the transgender community and mem-
bers of the medical community. Transgender theorist
Leslie Feinberg observes that the two-sex model began to
predominate in Western culture only in the early eight-
eenth century."' Yet, there exist "many [biological] grada-
tions running from female to male.' ' 7  In fact, biological
circumstances at birth can lead to a range of intersex
conditions .17
The difficulties which arise with class and sex-based
equal protection claims as applied to state anti-sodomy laws
173. See, e.g., Currah, supra note 157, at 183.
174. Id. at 183 ("Although a few psychologists are beginning to challenge
this model, most do not").
175. This Note touched upon the indeterminacy of homosexuality in the
preceding pages. For a more in-depth discussion of the difficulties in defining
homosexuality, see generally Laurie Rose Kepros, Queer Theory: Weed or Seed
in the Garden of Legal Theory?, 9 L. & SEXUALITY 279 (1999-2000).
176. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM
JOAN OF ARC TO RuPAuL 101 (1996) (quoting historian Randolph Trumbach).
177. Id. at 103 (quoting geneticist Dr. Anne Fausto-Sterling).
178. See Carl Gold, The Intersex Spectrum, Sex: Unknown, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/gender/spectrum.html (broadcast Oct. 30, 2001)
(last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
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evoke speculation as to how these laws can appropriately
apply to any group of individuals when the categories of
sexuality and gender are complicated. For example, if a
self-described bisexual woman has oral sex with a woman,
could she argue sex discrimination if prosecuted under the
Texas anti-sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence? What if
she is a male-to-female transsexual? What if the sex took
place just before her sex-reassignment surgery? What
about an individual who has anal sex with another man,
identifies as a man, but suffers from a genetic condition
whereby his genitals apear female and he is incapable of
producing testosterone?
These peculiar questions reveal the absurdity of not
only attempting to advance an equal protection argument
in sodomy cases but also of attempting to legislate sexuality
and gender. In order to keep track of to whom anti-sodomy
laws would rightly apply, judges and litigators alike would
be forced to either redefine fluid traits in terms of rigid di-
chotomies (i.e., male/female, heterosexual/homosexual) or,
as evidenced by the questions posed above, to delve into a
bizarre analysis of sexual identities, sexual acts, sexual
preferences, and physical genitalia."'0
In addition to the foregoing philosophical concerns,
utilizing an equal protection analysis would also require
that the sexual conduct of gays be judged against a hetero-
normative"" standard of sexual behavior. In arguing for a
substantive due process approach in gay rights cases,
179. This condition is known as a Testosterone Biosynthetic Defect and it
affects 1 in 13,000 births. X/Y individuals with this condition do not have the
properly functioning enzymes needed to convert cholesterol to testosterone.
When such enzymes prove completely incapable of creating testosterone, the
genitals appear female; when the enzymes function at a low level, ambiguous
genitals form. Id.
180. Patricia Currah discusses a similar absurdity that has resulted from
marriage legislation. A male-to-female transsexual was able to marry her
female lover in Oregon before officially requesting a certificate noting her sex
change because, without the new certificate, "the legal categories defined [her]
as a male." Currah, supra note 157, at 186. The inconsistencies inherent in
"legislating what is supposed to be natural, organic, and immutable" are
underscored when comparing the differences in statutes and case law that exist
across states. Id. at 186-87.
181. This term is a short version of "normative heterosexuality"-a term
that refers generally to the social and legal beliefs which favor heterosexual
standards for behavior, identity and relationships.
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Patricia Cain expresses her concern over this "assimila-
tionist nature" of equality arguments:
Substantive due process arguments would allow us (lesbians and
gay men) to argue independently about the value of intimate
association, construction of self through relationship, and the
authenticity of lesbian and gay love. We could tell our stories of
relationships in our own terms without forcing them to sound just
like everyone else's.18
Questions of constitutional equal protection necessitate
an acceptable standard of behavior and values by which the
group wishing to share in a particular set of rights will be
judged. Whether a particular type of intimacy possesses
value is thus determined by how and whether the dominant
group (i.e., heterosexuals) engages in such intimacy; gays
would be have to be compared to the benchmark of hetero-
sexual conduct.
A brief explanation of equality arguments as advanced
by feminists helps to illustrate this point more fully. While
there are multiple schools of feminist thought, for our pur-
poses, a discussion of two schools will suffice. On the one
hand, liberal feminists believe that liberation rests in free-
ing women from the "confines of traditional femininity.""3
In the legal context, liberal feminists argue that women are
no less rational than men are. As such, "women should
have equal opportunity with men to exercise their right to
make rational, self-interested choices."'84 This school of
thought, then, focuses on the similarities between men and
women in order to achieve equality.
Cultural feminists, on the other hand, focus on the dif-
ferences between men and women.185 They argue that insti-
tutions must be changed in order to give equal weight to
182. Cain, Legal History, supra note 8, at 1639.
183. See Iris Marion Young, Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist
Politics, in 8 WOMEN'S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM 173, 173 (1985). In this
article, Young refers generally to "Humanist Feminism," a term under which
liberal feminism is included. She states that "liberal feminism is indeed a
species of humanist feminism." Id. at 177.
184. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803, 829 (1990) [hereinafter Cain, Feminism].
185. Id. at 835-36; see also Young, supra note 183, at 176-77 (discussing the
differences between humanist feminism and "gynocentric feminism"-a brand
of feminism similar to cultural feminism).
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women's needs.'86 The needs and values of women, accord-
ing to cultural feminists, are to be valued as goods in and of
themselves, outside of any comparison to the needs and
values of men. Equality in this context is thus derived from
giving equal weight to typically "female" concerns and val-
ues (e.g., personal relationships, child-rearing, etc.). In
short, feminism can mean either that "we seek for women
the same opportunities and privileges the society gives to
men [liberal feminism] or ... that we assert the distinctive
value of womanhood against patriarchal denigration [cul-
tural feminism] .,187
Although these views of female equality differ markedly
from one another, they both demonstrate the problems in-
herent in utilizing an equality analysis to gain rights for an
oppressed group. Liberal feminism, by virtue of emphasiz-
ing the similarities between men and women, merely
"assimilates women into an unchanged male sphere."'8 s In
this sense liberal feminism only benefits women if they act
like men.f Cultural feminism is problematic because it
leaves unclear whether typically "female" values have
merely been created in opposition to typically "male" val-
ues 190 or whether these values are inherent to women. The
former is problematic because male standards are still
informing female values. And the latter is problematic be-
cause it risks advancing essentialist views of sex and
gender. In response to these difficulties, Cain concludes: "It
is time to move beyond equality.., and to focus on women
themselves. " "'
The concerns Cain raises in response to feminist defini-
tions of equality are also relevant to the realm of gay rights
litigation. Under a liberal feminist-type analysis, gays
would be forced to show that they are the same as hetero-
sexuals in order to prove why they should be accorded the
same privacy rights as heterosexuals. Under a cultural
186. See Cain, Feminism, supra note 184, at 836.
187. Young, supra note 183, at 180.
188. Cain, Feminism, supra note 184, at 831
189. See id. at 830 (discussing how this criticism has been charged against
Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
190. See id. at 837-38 (discussing how women-centered values are suspect
because they have only been created in response to patriarchy).
191. Id. at 806.
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feminist-type analysis, essentialist notions about homo-
sexuality would have to be advanced in order to argue that
homosexuality is inherently valuable. This causes the same
problems discussed earlier with regard to the
status/conduct distinction, 19 2 namely that there is no clear
consensus on what it means to be homosexual. Alterna-
tively, even if a cultural feminist-type analysis does not
invoke essentialism, it still fails to account for the possibil-
ity that typically "homosexual" means of expressing
intimacy have been created only in response to heteronor-
mative values.
These concerns are particularly problematic with
regard to anti-sodomy statutes. Examining goals helps to
illustrate this point. In the context of employment dis-
crimination, the goal of the person discriminated against is
to get hired for a job that an individual believes he or she
rightly deserves. It may be less difficult in this situation,
for instance, for a gay man to argue that he possesses the
same qualities as his heterosexual counterpart in order to
be hired for a particular position. But in the context of anti-
sodomy statutes, the goal may not be to gain the same exact
rights as heterosexuals, but rather to engage in any sexual
activity of one's choosing with privacy and dignity
(assuming the activity does not harm others). Indeed, if
gays argued for the same rights as heterosexuals in this
context under an equality rationale, anti-sodomy statutes
that did not discriminate based on sexual orientation could
remain in effect, to the detriment of gays (as well as any
heterosexuals who engage in oral or anal sex).'93
It is important to note here that gay intimacy should be
recognized outside of any comparison to heterosexual inti-
macy not because gay relationships are always inherently
192. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
193. Justice Kennedy points to this problem in support of his decision to
reject the petitioners' equal protection rationale. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 575; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor, on
the other hand, notes that she is confident any neutral sodomy law "would not
long stand in our democratic society" so long "as the Equal Protection Clause
requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the conduct of homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike." Id. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Without more
explanation, it appears that Justice O'Connor asserts here that sodomy laws
which infringe not only upon the rights of homosexuals, but also upon the rights
of heterosexuals, are sure to be struck down presumably because it is more
egregious to infringe upon the privacy rights of heterosexuals in this context
that to infringe upon the rights of homosexuals.
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different that heterosexual relationships. In fact, many gay
couples (or gay lovers for that matter) have precisely the
same desires as heterosexual couples. Rather, the inherent
value of homosexual intimacy should be valued because of
the possibility that these relationships can vary from
heterosexual ones. If gays are to gain meaningful legal rec-
ognition, then litigators must craft arguments that begin to
raise public consciousness about this possibility.
C. Due Process to the Rescue?
A substantive due process argument may remedy some
of the difficulties inherent in an equal protection analysis.
Unlike equal protection, a substantive due process rationale
opens up the possibility of examining gay intimacy outside
of any reference to heterosexual intimacy. It allows us to
see what virtues gay relationships might possess in and of
themselves, and not just in comparison to heteronormative
standards of sexual encounters or relationships that are
considered valuable. In short, it does not allow heterosexu-
als to set the standard by which gay intimacy will or can be
judged because it focuses on preserving the dignity of gays
as individuals instead of focusing on the ways in which gays
are similar to heterosexuals.
A brief discussion of the right to privacy provides a use-
ful framework under which this proposition may be more
fully analyzed. There are (at least) two levels upon which
the gay constitutional right to privacy lies. The first of
these is based on a libertarian-type notion that the right of
privacy is essentially the right to be left alone. The dis-
senters in Bowers' advanced this brand of privacy95 by
focusing on the right to be free from government intrusion
and the right to choose how to conduct one's life'96 (with re-
gard to consensual sex). Harvard Professor Michael Sandel
frames this brand of the privacy right as an argument for
"toleration."197 Those in favor of mere toleration do not
place a moral judgment on the sex act itself; they simply
194. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
195. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (1989).
196. 478 U.S. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. Sandel, supra note 195, at 533.
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assert people should have the choice to engage in behavior
that does not harm others.198
The "second" level of the gay right to privacy is more
substantive in nature as it views homosexual relationships
as morally valuable. A substantive privacy argument takes
the toleration argument to a higher level by viewing homo-
sexual intimacy as more than a mere sex act. A same-sex
relationship is validated because it is an acceptable way of
life. More specifically, under this view "the connection
between heterosexual and homosexual relations is not that
both result from individual choice but that both realize im-
portant human goods." 9 9 Under this view, two important
concepts coalesce: individual autonomy and social gain. If
individuals are more productive members of society when
acting in communities and relationships, as opposed to
isolation, then it is in society's best interest to support rela-
tionships among individuals. Further, a central precept to
individual autonomy in a free society is that individuals be
afforded the option to choose their partners, sexual or oth-
erwise. In this sense, society stands to gain by supporting
homosexual relationships.
Utilizing Sandel's articulation of a substantive privacy
right for the petitioners' in Lawrence can rectify some of the
problems inherent in an equality analysis. However, in
analyzing whether and why a due process rationale is
appropriate in Lawrence, it is important to distinguish
between a toleration argument and a substantive due proc-
ess argument. One of the major problems with toleration is
that it risks reinforcing the view of gays as primarily sexual
beings,2 0 thus enforcing a strict distinction between the pri-
vate and the public. This distinction between public and
private is essentially a distinction between those things
that should be shown and those that should be concealed
entirely."' Just as women throughout history were rele-
gated to the private spheres of life by virtue of their "bodily
functions,"2 2 a toleration-type argument for gay rights
198. Id. at 534.
199. Id.
200. Gay men, in particular, often fall victim to the stereotype of gays as
promiscuous.
201. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 64 (1958).
202. Id.
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forces gays to remain veiled behind their bedroom doors.
Because this standpoint defines homosexuality primarily
through sex and sexual desire, homosexuality can only be
tolerated as long as it remains hidden from view.
Contrastly, a substantive due process view of privacy rec-
ognizes that sex is just one aspect of the debate.
Whether the Court's privacy rationale in Lawrence rises
to the level of a substantive privacy right or whether it is a
mere call for toleration of gays is not easily answered. The
Court, at times, articulates what appears to be a substan-
tive privacy right for gays, propounding the virtues homo-
sexual intimacy may share with heterosexual intimacy. For
example, as noted above, Justice Kennedy directly criticizes
the Court in Bowers for minimizing the petitioner's claim as
simply a claim about the right to engage in sexual
conduct.2 °3 Justice Kennedy notes such treatment of gays is
demeaning in the same way it is demeaning to state that
"marriage is simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course." 4  Quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2"5 the
Court further notes that:
"[The matters of marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education] involving the most
intimate personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence.... Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under the compulsion of the State." Persons in
homosexual relationships may seek autonomy for these purposes,
just as heterosexual persons do. 206
By analogizing gay intimacy to marriage, procreation, and
family relationships, the Court in these passages explicitly
recognizes that gay intimacy may comprise more than a
mere sex act.0 7
203. See supra notes 108, 145 and accompanying text.
204. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); see also id.
205. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
207. See Paris R. Baldacci, Lawrence and Garner: The Love (Or At Least
Sexual Attraction) That Finally Dared Speak Its Name, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
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However, two aspects of the opinion are troublesome.
First, the Court is careful to limit its holding. Some argue
that the Court's limitations are tantamount to an articula-
tion of a mere right to be left alone,2 °8 rather than any
substantive statement on the inherent worth of gay inti-
macy. As one scholar notes, the Lawrence opinion contains
language that "gives and then takes"2° 9-resulting in an
opinion that at once calls for a recognition of the value of
gay intimacy while also noting that the government is not
required to formally recognize any such value2 10 (through
same-sex marriage, for instance). It appears, then, that the
Court's rhetoric supports a more substantive right to
privacy, while its actual holding amounts to a mere right to
engage in consensual sexual conduct without intervention
by the State.
Second, even though the Court recognizes the value of
gay intimacy outside of sex, it nonetheless expounds het-
eronormative values as the starting point from which to
analyze gay relationships. In order to validate gay inti-
macy, the Court feels compelled to point out that gays are
essentially just like heterosexuals. Homosexuals seek
autonomy for the same reasons heterosexuals do (i.e., to
choose marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, or education).21 Hence, homosex-
L.J. 289, 293 (2004) ("[The Court in Lawrence] did not reduce [the concept of
intimate contact] to the sexual act involved as it had. . . in Bowers.").
208. See generally Franke, supra note 140.
209. Herald, supra note 141, at 29.
210. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("[The present case] does
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.").
211. Ironically, this criticism points to the fact that the Court feels
compelled to characterize the relationship of the petitioners in Lawrence as
more serious than it may actually have been. Nan Hunter notes: "[Slegments of
the Lawrence opinion embody the heteronormative impulses of a court
struggling to position the gay men before it as comparable to married persons,
even though neither the record nor their attorneys suggested that John
Lawrence and Tyron Garner had anything other than a mutually desired
fleeting encounter." (Hunter, Living, supra note 6, at 1138 (citing Kendall
Thomas)). Katherine Franke takes this sentiment one step further by arguing
that the Lawrence opinion domesticates gay men and that the "price of victory
in Lawrence has been to trade sexuality for domesticity." Franke, supra note
140, at 1409. On its face, this Note might appear to embody a paradox that
both criticizes the Court for applying heteronormative standards but also asks
for a more substantive recognition of these standards. However, this Note uses
the term "intimacy" broadly to encompass sex and relationships. If, at times, it
appears that this Note is calling for recognition of gay relationships, it is only
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ual desires are validated because they mirror heterosexual
desires. These comparisons of gays to heterosexuals repre-
sent the same difficulties discussed earlier in regards to
equality arguments.
This begs the question of whether some of the problems
inherent in an equality analysis (i.e., the necessity of judg-
ing gays against heteronormative standards) are really
remedied by a due process approach. If the Court is going
to apply a heteronormative standard regardless of whether
it is adjudicating a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause, then why should litigators not
simply develop litigation strategies under equality princi-
ples and due process principle or equality principles alone?
The answer lies in the potential for a substantive privacy
argument. Lawrence leaves open the possibility of future
legal arguments based on a meaningful privacy right for
gays. Equality arguments, on the other hand, suggest the
utilization of a heteronormative standard by their very na-
ture-especially in the context of state anti-sodomy laws.
The same problem is not inherent in a due process analysis.
Rather, the problem arises because of the way in which the
Lawrence Court articulated the right.
Yet, by characterizing the petitioners' claim as one of
due process, the Court has opened the door to future litiga-
tors to begin articulating constitutional arguments that
encompass a more meaningful definition of gay intimacy.
No longer will gay rights litigators be forced to "litigate
around" Bowers. 2 More importantly, the victories that flow
from innovative new due process arguments can be true vic-
tories for the gay community. An equality argument that is
predicated on heteronormative values or false dichotomies
will not serve to challenge deeply engrained and problem-
atic views regarding gender and sexuality. Even if such an
argument succeeds in court, the result is a narrow win that
could eventually work against the gay community.
The crux of this contention is that the path down which
gay rights litigators turn now will determine where they
because this is arguably the next logical step in the jurisprudence of gay rights
after Lawrence. And, to move from a paradigm which frames gays as solely
sexual to one in which gays are seen as individuals choosing to enter more
lasting relationships outside of mere sex is not necessarily a regression. It is
only a regression if the paradigm insists that gays be "domesticated."
212. See supra note 75.
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end up in the future. In this sense, the importance of
avoiding heteronormativity is not merely theoretical or
symbolic. The way we talk about gay rights and gay inti-
macy matters. Legal rhetoric shapes public opinion. And
public opinion shapes the lives of gays. If the end goal is
same-sex marriage, for instance, then legal arguments
advanced against anti-sodomy statues must be framed with
that goal in mind. However, as will be discussed below, it is
crucial that these arguments remain intelligible to the pub-
lic at large. In order to prevent a detrimental cultural
backlash, Post-Lawrence litigation strategies must strike a
delicate balance between forward-looking substantive pri-
vacy arguments and more subtle concepts of gay legal
rights.
D. One Step at a Time
One criticism that has been aimed at the Lawrence
majority is that the opinion fails to articulate any clear rule
regarding the gay right to privacy. 213 And, although this
tactic may represent a more flexible judicial approach to the
rigidity of traditional due process analyses,214 it nonetheless
leaves lower courts with a significant amount of discretion
as to whether and how the Lawrence Court's holding is to
be followed. Furthermore, it is unclear as to exactly which
future cases the holding in Lawrence would even apply.2 5
Yet this criticism has been coupled with recognition
that Lawrence is a seminal case within the body of gay
rights jurisprudence."6 Even in the narrowest of interpre-
tations,21 1 the Court's opinion is significant in that it
removes the presumption of criminality that has affected
the lives of many gays both legally and socially. Before
Lawrence, gays could be denied custody of their children 21 8
213. See sources cited supra note 141.
214. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
215. See Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, supra note 141, at 1172 ("It is
most obscure which future cases will be affected by the holding of Lawrence.").
216. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
217. A narrow interpretation of Lawrence might cite its holding as standing
for a mere toleration of gays, rather than a substantive right to privacy.
218. See Eskridge, Jurisprudence of Tolerance, supra note 74, at 1095-97
(discussing "antigay presumptions in child custody cases.").
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or denied employment 2 9 by virtue of their "criminal" statusor deied o nt1 21b
under state anti-sodomy laws.20 After Lawrence, a strong
argument can be made challenging these rationales,"' espe-
cially in light of the Court's explicit criticism of the crimi-
nalization of homosexuality.
222
The language utilized by Justice Kennedy is also
remarkable, especially when compared to the gay rights
cases that preceded it."23 The Court's opinion may in fact be
remembered most for its unprecedented rhetoric and tone.
Law professor Edward Stein notes:
[M]any of the harsh effects of Bowers came [not from its legal
reasoning but rather] from its underlying assumptions and
attitudes, as reflected in its tone, its language and its historical
analysis. Perhaps, similarly, the most important legacy of
Lawrence does not follow directly from its legal reasoning.
Hence, the Court's language in support of a gay right to
privacy may overshadow its confusing reasoning.
Moreover, gays would most likely have been politically
disadvantaged had the Lawrence Court clearly articulated a
rule supporting the notion that gay relationships are goods
in and of themselves (i.e., had the Court had clearly
rejected a mere toleration approach) or if the Court had
clearly designated a fundamental right. While the
219. See Stein, Introducing Lawrence, supra note 78, at 265. Stein
discusses Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a case in which
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of
a ban on gays from serving in the FBI.
220. Weinstein and DeMarco point out that this presumption of criminality
"sanctions a larger-scale collateral discrimination." Weinstein & DeMarco,
supra note 144, at 430.
221. See, e.g., Matt Larsen, Note, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay
Parents' Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 53 (2004) (noting that Lawrence offers "powerful support" for the
argument that constitutional law should operate to exclude a parent's sexual
orientation in determining custody awards).
222. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) ("When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and private spheres. ... The stigma this criminal statute imposes...
is not trivial.").
223. A comparison of the language utilized in both Bowers and Lawrence
illustrates this point. See supra Part II.A.
224. Stein, Introducing Lawrence, supra note 78, at 288.
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Lawrence holding was indeed met with ardent criticism by
its opponents, 2 2 had the Court's holding gone further, the
backlash with which it would have been met would have
been even greater. In fact, in light of the 2004 election, gay
rights groups began rethinking their strategies2 6 after
eleven states passed constitutional amendments, eight of
which also voted for a ban on same-sex civil unions.2  Ar-
guably, this backlash was a response to such events as the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling legalizing same-sex
marriage22' and the performance of gay marriages in San
Francisco in defiance of state law. 9 Similar repercussions
may have resulted after Lawrence if the Court had argued
the case differently.
The Court's strategy and holding, although limited, are
thus in tune with the current political landscape in the
United States.23 ° Although many Americans support some
sort of legal protections for gays, many are still disinclined
to accept a more expansive view of gay rights.23 ' Given this
reluctance, it is likely that the general public would have
opposed a holding in Lawrence that either expressly broad-
ened the scope of the gay right to privacy or failed to
explicitly limit this right. The Court surely could not have
forced the country to accept a more progressive definition of
225. See sources cited supra notes 4 and 5.
226. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at Al; Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay
Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at Al; Lisa Leff, Gay Advocates
Examine Role in Election (Nov. 6, 2004), available at
www.boston.com/news/politics/president/articles/2004/l 1/06/gay-advocatesexa
minerole in election/ ("Gay and lesbian advocates have been doing some soul-
searching since President Bush's election victory, wondering if same-sex
wedding marches through San Francisco and Massachusetts tipped the scales
to Republicans promising to restore traditional values. Exit polling showed
'moral values' were at the top of voters' concerns, especially in the 11 states
where voters banned same-sex marriage-ballot amendments inspired by the
parade of weddings.").
227. See Leff, supra note 226; see also Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning On
State Ballots (Nov. 3, 2004), at
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/ 11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage/index.html.
228. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
229. See Leff, supra note 226.
230. See Hunter, Living, supra note 6, at 1104 ("[Tlhe Lawrence opinion is
in perfect tune with its times.").
231. See Leff, supra note 226 ("[Slurveys of voters leaving the polls suggest
that many who disapprove of gay marriage are not opposed to civil unions.").
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homosexuality or homosexual intimacy if the country is not
willing to go along.232
CONCLUSION
The force with which the gay rights movement has pro-
gressed in the Supreme Court is sometimes sporadic. But
more often than not, this force can be examined with a rea-
sonable eye towards history, the current state of constitu-
tional law, and the potential for future change. Just under
twenty years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that a state is
entitled to ban sex between consenting gay adults based
purely on a majority belief that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable. In 2003, we saw the Court in
Lawrence adopting a drastically different view in which
homosexuals, and the relationships they choose to enter,
are to be regarded with respect and dignity.
Although the holding in Lawrence was expressly limited
by the Court, its decision to deliver its ruling under the Due
Process Clause leaves unlimited potential for future litiga-
tors to develop innovative new arguments touting a more
substantive right to privacy for gays. Had the Court chosen
to argue Lawrence under an equality analysis, this poten-
tial would be limited by the assimilationist nature of equal
protection arguments. However, as this Note is being writ-
ten, eleven states have voted against gay marriage, forcing
gay rights groups to reconsider their legal and political
strategies. The country is not yet ready to accept such
innovative new legal arguments.
If gay rights history has shown us anything, it is that
every victory will be met with opposition, whether it is a
downgrade in legal rights or a cultural backlash. Because
the American populace is hesitant to accept a broad view of
gay legal rights, the Lawrence Court's articulation of a lim-
ited due process right of privacy for gays was in step with
the current backdrop of public opinion regarding gay rights.
Yet, regardless of whether a broader holding in Lawrence
would have been a detriment or a benefit to the gay com-
munity, it is nonetheless clear that the rhetoric and tone of
the opinion will reverberate in gay rights cases for years to
come.
232. Eskridge, Jurisprudence of Tolerance, supra note 74, at 1026.
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